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NO ROOM FOR DISSENT: CHINA’S LAWS AGAINST 
DISTURBING SOCIAL ORDER UNDERMINE ITS 
COMMITMENTS TO FREE SPEECH AND HAMPER THE 
RULE OF LAW 
Mindy Kristin Longanecker† 
Abstract:  The term “disturbing social order” appears in several Chinese civil and 
criminal laws.  The vagueness of these three words, combined with the national culture of 
censorship, undermines various legal provisions that guarantee freedom of speech in 
China.  As a result, laws against disturbing social order suppress nonviolent political 
speech in this rising world power.  This became clear during the 2008 Summer Olympics 
in Beijing, where both individual protestors and corps of journalists found their work 
frustrated by laws against disturbing social order. 
Chinese lawmakers could remedy this conflict of laws by clarifying the term 
“disturbing social order,” and by creating outlets for nonviolent dissent that are protected 
by procedural safeguards.  Such measures would help reinvest the Chinese people’s faith 
in their government and grant the country increased political legitimacy in the 
international community.  While such action would represent a departure from centuries 
of censorship in the country, it is crucial to China’s continued political and economic 
success. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 11, 2008, while millions of Chinese watched to see how 
many medals their country could win in the Olympic Games, Ji Sizun 
disappeared.1  Ji Sizun was a legal advocate from the Fujian province.2  Prior 
to his disappearance, he had unsuccessfully tried three times to apply for a 
permit to protest against government corruption in China.3  Ji Sizun was 
detained when he returned to the Beijing Public Security Bureau to confront 
officials about the disappearance of his friend Tang Xuechen.4  Tang 
Xuechen disappeared when he sought a similar protest petition several days 
prior.5  Both were missing or detained for several days during the Games.6 
                                           
†
  Juris Doctor expected 2010, University of Washington School of Law.  The author would like to 
thank Professor Dongsheng Zang for serving as an advisor for this piece, and Jimmy So for contributing his 
fascinating personal insights on the subject.  The author also would like to thank Devin Smith, Mike Peters, 
and Adam Andrews for helping refine impassioned ramblings into a legal argument, as well as David and 
Mary Jane Longanecker, and Jacob Phillips for their constant support. 
1
  Jill Drew & Ariana Eunjung Cha, No Permits, No Protests in Beijing’s Special ‘Pens’, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 15, 2008, at A14. 
2
  Id. 
3
  Id. 
4
  Id. 
5
  Id. 
6
  See id (explaining that Ji Sizun was detained and Tang Xuechen was missing). 
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In August of 2008, 4.7 billion viewers across the world watched the 
Games of the XXIX Olympiad (“the Games”) held in Beijing, China.7  The 
Games were a historic event for China, which had fought hard to win its 
Olympic bid and spent years preparing for the arrival of athletes and 
spectators.8  Beyond the echo of the drums from the Bird’s Nest,9 there was 
another contest going on—one that has been going on in China for centuries:  
the contest to be heard. 
Many people, including Chinese nationals, saw the Games as a 
potential coming-of-age party for the rising world power.10  While many 
Chinese saw the 2008 Olympics as a huge success, some spectators were not 
so convinced.  Amidst scandals about underage gymnasts,11 ejected 
protestors,12 and frustrated journalists,13 many onlookers across the world 
voiced outrage at China’s censorship, which remains a potent force in that 
nation’s culture today.14 
While the interactions between journalists and the Chinese authorities 
during the Games highlighted the issue of censorship, the practice of 
denying free speech in the name of protecting social order existed long 
before the Beijing Olympics.  This practice, which has roots in Chinese 
history, is codified in various Chinese laws that prohibit “disturbing social 
order.”15  Despite the Chinese Constitution’s guarantee of free speech, laws 
                                           
7
  Beijing Olympics Attracts Record 4.7 Billion TV Viewers, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 6, 2008, available 
at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/olympics/2008-09/06/content_7005208.htm. 
8
  See Beijing Sets Records in Olympics Preparation, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 24, 2004, 
available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Jul/102281.htm; International Olympic Committee 
Website, Beijing 2008: Election, http://www.olympic.org/uk/games/beijing/election_uk.asp (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2009). 
9
  The Beijing National Stadium is colloquially known as the Bird’s Nest.  See Alex Pasternack, 
National Stadium, ARCHITECTURAL RECORD, July 2008, available at http://archrecord.construction.com/ 
projects/portfolio/archives/0807nationalstadium-1.asp.  It served as the centerpiece for the Olympic Games.  
See id. 
10
  China’s Coming Out Party, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 8, 2008, available at http://www.thestar.com/ 
Sports/Olympics/article/242172. 
11
  See Chris Foley, Olympic Probe into Age-fixing of Chinese Gymnasts, THE SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD, Aug. 22, 2008, available at http://news.smh.com.au/world/olympic-probe-into-agefixing-of-
chinese-gymnasts-20080822-4049.html. 
12
  See Jill Drew, China's Choreographed Detentions: Expelled U.S. Protesters Tell of Hospitality 
and Haranguing, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2008, at A1. 
13
  See Jim Yardley, Two Concerns for Olympics: Air and Access, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2008, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/sports/olympics/09beijing.html. 
14
  See, e.g., Bill Plaschke, Beijing Olympics Were Logistically Successful and Sneaky Too, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/24/sports/sp-olyplaschke24; Saul 
Newman, Why Grandpa Boycotted the Olympics, HAARETZ, Aug. 13, 2008, available at 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1009630.html. 
15
  See, e.g., XIAN FA arts. 28 & 53 (1982) (P.R.C.); Law on Assemblies, Processions, and 
Demonstrations [LAPD] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 1989, 
effective Oct. 31, 1989) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) (P.R.C.); Regulation on Complaint 
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against disturbing social order often triumph because of the vast expanse of 
potential behaviors they forbid, coupled with China’s pervasive culture of 
censorship.16  Ultimately, China’s efforts to preserve social order through 
censorship undermine an important element of the rule of law. 
While “disturbing social order” has been linked to activities such as 
violent protests, Chinese officials have also interpreted the term to 
encompass constitutionally protected free speech.17  As this Comment will 
show, the term has been extended to criminalize actions ranging from 
peaceful protests to publications and web logs (“blogs”) critical of the 
Government and communism.18  More recently, efforts to prevent social 
order disturbances in China have even been applied to thwart mere attempts 
to get protest petitions.19  The broad interpretation of “disturbing social 
order” allows police to investigate activists, gather evidence, and later 
charge them with more serious crimes, such as subversion or dissemination 
of state secrets.20 
The terms “disturbing social order” or “disturbing public order” 
appear in various constitutional articles, as well as criminal and commercial 
laws.21  This Comment asserts that China’s failure to specifically define 
these terms has led to disproportionate, irregular, and inconsistent 
enforcement of such laws.  It also proposes that this legal phenomenon, in 
turn, has hindered not only commercial progress and human rights, but also 
some aspects of the burgeoning rule of law in China.  For example, laws 
                                                                                                                              
Letters and Visits [RCLV] (promulgated by the St. Council, Jan. 10, 2005, effective May 1, 2005) 
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) (P.R.C.).  While this comment will focus on crimes of 
“disturbing social order,” a similar phenomenon exists with laws against “subversion,” disseminating “state 
secrets,” endangering the state, and other related crimes, and the same behavior is often brought under the 
scrutiny of all such laws. 
16
  XIAN FA art. 35 (1982) (P.R.C.). 
17
  Chinese officials have rejected applications for legitimate protests and detained individuals with 
legitimate concerns.  See, e.g., Drew & Cha, supra note 1; Audra Ang, China Has Not Approved Olympic 
Protest Requests, USA TODAY, Aug. 18, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-
08-18-2381524096_x.htm; Ariana Eunjung Cha, China’s Would-Be Protesters Denied, WASH. POST, Aug. 
6, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/05/AR2008080 
503197_pf.html. 
18
  See infra Section III. 
19
  See Drew & Cha, supra note 1. 
20
  For an example of one such recent incident where a popular AIDS activist was convicted of 
subverting state power in a one day trial, see Scott Simon, Morning Edition: Honor for Jailed, Chinese 
Ailing Dissident (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 25, 2008) (recording and transcript are available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyid=96134185).  Even with laws against “disturbing 
social order” available as a veil for arresting those who express controversial views, the government still 
does not always give a reason for its arrests.  See Jane Macartney, Jigme, the Tibetan Monk Who Spoke 
Against Chinese Police, Is Arrested, TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 4, 2008, available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5081553.ece. 
21
  See, e.g., XIAN FA arts. 28 & 53 (1982) (P.R.C.); LAPD; RCLV. 
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regarding disturbing social order often override existing laws intended to 
guarantee free speech and press, such as Articles 35 and 41 of the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (“CPRC”).  By defining 
these terms more precisely, the laws employing them will be less subject to 
discriminatory application against those who wish to peaceably speak out 
against the Chinese government. 
Part II of this Comment will describe the history and development of 
the laws guaranteeing free speech and laws forbidding disturbance of social 
order, as well as the culture that has led to their current applications.  Part III 
asserts that due to the inherent vagueness of the term “disturbing social 
order,” combined with the overarching tradition of censorship in China, laws 
employing the term have been allowed to trump free speech commitments.  
Part IV suggests that in order to fulfill Article 35’s commitment to free 
speech and avoid arbitrary, overzealous, and inappropriate application, the 
term “disturbing social order” must be more clearly defined, and satisfactory 
outlets for political dissent must be created.  Part V examines whether or not 
such revision is feasible, likely, or desirable given the history and culture of 
censorship in China. 
II. BACKGROUND 
China has increasingly codified its commitment to free speech over 
the years by rewriting its Constitution and passing laws that proclaim to 
protect citizens’ right to free speech.  Despite these actions, however, 
censorship remains in China.  In practice, limitations on acts that disturb 
social order—including those present in the laws that are intended to 
preserve free speech—serve to restrict free speech.  Censorship remains in 
part due to problems of enforceability within Chinese law, and in part 
because of the country’s unique history and culture of free speech 
suppression. 
A. In Recent Years, China Has Codified Several Laws Promising Free 
Speech 
Despite its history of censorship, the Chinese government has codified 
several laws guaranteeing free speech and expression.  China’s Constitution 
was adopted by the 5th National People’s Congress (“NPC”) on December 
4, 1982.22  Article 35 of the CPRC (“Article 35”) holds that “[c]itizens of the 
                                           
22
  XIAN FA (1982) (P.R.C.). 
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People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of 
assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration.”23 
Article 41 of the CPRC (“Article 41”) speaks more specifically to 
freedom of expression.24  It proclaims citizens’ right to criticize and make 
suggestions to the state and its officials.25  It further adds that state organs 
must address complaints in a responsible manner, and such charges shall not 
be suppressed, nor shall citizens making them be subject to retaliation.26 
Beyond these overarching constitutional guarantees of free speech, 
follow-up legislation purports to protect freedom of expression in China.  In 
1989, the government passed the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Assemblies, Processions, and Demonstrations (“LAPD”), reinforcing the 
existence of these three named freedoms.27  The first provision lays out the 
statute’s goal, stating:  “Pursuant to the Constitution, this Law is enacted to 
safeguard citizens’ exercise of their right to assembly, procession and 
demonstration according to law and to maintain social stability and public 
order.”28  In recent years, China has also been party to various international 
agreements guaranteeing freedom of expression, including the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights29 and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.30 
Additionally, while for many years there was no explicit constitutional 
right to petition in China, one could be read into the nation’s laws.31  Even 
so, such a right follows logically from the existence of other rights, such as 
                                           
23
  Id. art. 35.  The previous constitution guaranteed these rights, as well as the right to strike, and the 
“four bigs”:  the rights to speak out freely, air views fully, hold great debates, and write big-character 
posters.  These, however, were abolished by the NPC in 1980 and have been cracked down on in the wake 
of the adoption of the 1982 Constitution.  See HENRY YUHUAI HE, DICTIONARY OF THE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 438 (M.E. Sharpe 2001). 
24
  “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China have the right to criticize and make suggestions to any 
state organ or functionary.  Citizens have the right to make to relevant state organs complaints and charges 
against, or exposures of, violation of the law or dereliction of duty by any state organ or functionary . . . .  
In case of complaints, charges or exposures made by citizens, the state organ concerned must deal with 
them in a responsible manner after ascertaining the facts.  No one may suppress such complaints, charges 
and exposures, or retaliate against the citizens making them.”  XIAN FA art. 41 (1982) (P.R.C.). 
25
  Id. 
26
  Id. 
27
  LAPD. 
28
  Id. art. 1. 
29
  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 220A (XXI), art. 19, U.N. Doc. 
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].  This agreement, however, 
includes a limitation for exercise of free speech rights “[f]or the protection of national security or of public 
order.”  Id. art. 19 § 3(b) (italics added). 
30
  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 19, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 
1948). 
31
  See Xiaoping Chen, The Difficult Road for Rights Advocacy: An Unpredictable Future for the 
Development of the Rule of Law in China, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 231-32 (2006). 
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the right to criticize, the right to make suggestions, the right to make 
complaints, and the right to make charges or expose violations of the law or 
dereliction of duty—all of which are protected under Article 41.32  Based on 
this logic, some argue that the right to petition is a fundamental right of the 
Chinese.33  This right was finally codified in the Regulation on Complaint 
Letters and Visits (“RCLV”), passed in 2005.34  This law was enacted “with 
a view to keeping the people’s government at all levels in close contact with 
the masses” by “protecting the legitimate rights and interests” of those who 
seek to criticize the government.35  The law created a system for citizens to 
“[report] facts, [submit] proposals or opinions, or [file] a complaint to the 
people’s governments at various levels.”36 
In preparation for the 2008 Olympics, the Chinese government 
promised that journalists would have the same access they had enjoyed at 
previous Olympics.37  The government also made provisions allowing for 
public protests during the event, so long as one obtained a protest permit, 
adhered to certain rules, and limited activities to designated protest zones.38  
Journalists and would-be protestors alike looked forward to discussing 
politically sensitive issues that were normally off limits in China, such as the 
Tibetan freedom movement, government corruption, and Communist 
oppression.39  They saw this as an opportunity to showcase various 
important political and human rights issues not only to fellow Chinese, but 
also to the world abroad.40 
                                           
32
  XIAN FA art. 41 (1982) (P.R.C.).  See generally Xiaoping Chen, supra note 31, at 231-32. 
33
  See Xiaoping Chen, supra note 31, at 231-32. 
34
  RCLV. 
35
  Id. art. 1. 
36
  Id. art. 2. 
37
  See PEN AMERICAN CENTER, BEYOND THE OLYMPICS: THE FREEDOM TO WRITE IN CHINA, AFTER 
THE SPOTLIGHT (Oct. 17, 2008), available at http://www.pen.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/2894/ 
prmID/172.  See also Andrew Jacobs, China to Limit Web Access During Olympic Games, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 31, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/31/sports/olympics/31china.html [hereinafter 
Jacobs, Limit Web Access]. 
38
  See Ang, supra note 17; Cha, supra note 17. 
39
  See generally Kathrin Bennhold & Keith Bradsher, From Beijing to Battery Park, Activists Stress 
Causes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/09/sports/olympics/ 
09protest.html; Andrew Jacobs, Specter of Arrest Deters Demonstrators in China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/14/sports/olympics/14protest.html [hereinafter Jacobs, 
Arrest Deters Demonstrators]; see also Jacobs, Limit Web Access, supra note 37. 
40
  See Jacobs, Limit Web Access, supra note 37. 
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B. Despite Free Speech Commitments, Censorship Runs Rampant in 
China Due to Laws that Function to Restrict Free Speech 
While many of the aforementioned laws suggest affirmative grants of 
free speech in China, they have not been applied in a meaningful way.  Free 
speech laws often undermine their own provisions or application.  In 
addition, other constitutional and statutory provisions limit, or overrule, 
freedom of expression in China.  For example, laws prohibiting “disturbing 
social order” work contrary to free speech commitments.  As one writer put 
it: 
The restrictions [on expression and other civil and political 
rights] in PRC law generally serve a legitimate purpose on their 
face, such as the safeguarding of national security, public order, 
or morality.  However, in some cases involving criticism of 
government policies . . . the restrictions appear only to serve the 
interest of the ruling party or to protect the reputation of 
particular officials rather than to protect national security or the 
interests of the nation as a whole.41 
1. The CPRC Curtails Free Speech by Countering Free Speech 
Protections and by Limiting Provisions that Guarantee Free Speech 
Various constitutional and statutory provisions limit or work contrary 
to legal guarantees of free speech in China.  The most prominent limitations 
of free speech in the name of maintaining social order include Articles 28, 
53, and 51 of the CRPC (“Article 28,” “Article 53,” and “Article 51”, 
respectively), the LAPD, and the RCLV.42  These constitutional provisions 
and laws either explicitly limit free speech to preserve social order or 
implicitly limit free speech while proclaiming to encourage such rights. 
a. Various Constitutional Provisions Limit Free Speech in the Name of 
Maintaining Social Order 
Article 28 states, in relevant part, that “[t]he state maintains public 
order and suppresses treasonable and other counter-revolutionary  activities;  
it penalizes actions that endanger public security and disrupt the socialist 
economy.”43  Article 53, regarding obedience to the Constitution, supports 
                                           
41
  Randall Peerenboom, Law and Development of Constitutional Democracy in China: Problem or 
Paradigm?, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 185, 215 (2005) [hereinafter Peerenboom, Problem or Paradigm?]. 
42
  See generally XIAN FA arts. 28, 53 & 51 (1982) (P.R.C.); LAPD; RCLV. 
43
  XIAN FA art. 28 (1982) (P.R.C.) (emphasis added). 
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Article 28 and requires obedience to the rule of law generally.  It provides 
that citizens “must abide by the constitution and the law” and must 
additionally “observe . . . public order.”44  Notably, it was this Article that 
was invoked in cracking down on the so-called “four bigs” in response to 
student protests in the mid-1980s.45 
Article 51, regarding the interests of the state, functions as a catchall.  
It adds the most forceful caveat to all Chinese constitutional provisions, 
providing that “[t]he exercise by citizens of the People’s Republic of China 
of their freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state, 
of society and of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of 
other citizens.”46 
b. Provisions of Laws that Appear to Grant Free Speech Functionally 
Limit Free Speech 
In addition to laws that expressly limit free speech, provisions of some 
Chinese free speech laws undermine the very rights they purport to protect.  
For instance, Article 4 of the LAPD states that “[i]n exercising their right to 
assembly, procession and demonstration, citizens must abide by the 
Constitution and the laws, shall not oppose the cardinal principles specified 
in the Constitution and shall not impair state, public or collective interests or 
the lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens.”47  In practice, this language 
prohibits people from expressing views that oppose the government.48  By 
making the LAPD subject to the Constitution under Article 4 of that act, 
lawmakers rendered moot any implicit protection of free speech included in 
the statute.  Generally, when it comes to free speech, the restrictive portions 
of the Chinese Constitution prevail over guarantees of civil rights.49  As 
recently as last year, the government of China “interpreted the [Communist 
Party’s] ‘leading role,’ as mandated in the constitution, as superseding and 
circumscribing [freedom of speech and of the press].”50 
                                           
44
  The full text of the article reads, “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China must abide by the 
Constitution and the law, keep state secrets, protect public property and observe labour discipline and 
public order and respect social ethics.”  Id. art. 53. 
45
  See HE, supra note 23. 
46
  XIAN FA art. 51 (1982) (P.R.C.). 
47
  LAPD art. 4. 
48
  See LIN FENG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CHINA 272-273 (Sweet & Maxwell Asia 2000). 
49
  See id. at 268-69. 
50
  Bureau of Democracy, Hum. Rts., and Lab., U.S. Dept. of State, 2007 Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) § 2(a) (Mar. 11, 2008), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100518.htm [hereinafter U.S. Dept. of State, Human Rights 
Practices: China]. 
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In the case of free speech, Articles 28, 51, and 53 reflect and enforce 
the cardinal principle of “preserving social order” in a manner that 
eviscerates free speech protections found in Article 35 and the LAPD.  
While Article 35 supposedly protects “freedom of speech, [and] of the 
press,” and the LAPD reinforces the freedoms of “assembly, processing, and 
demonstration,” in practice these freedoms are subordinate to the 
preservation of public order.  Moreover, one’s failure to adhere to the 
relevant provisions of the LAPD can result in criminal charges,51 a threat 
which undoubtedly weighs heavily on citizens as they consider whether to 
risk exercising their putative right to free speech. 
The RCLV, another law which appeared to facilitate free speech, has 
been criticized for being hasty work.52  The stated purposes of the law were 
to provide citizens an organized, legal mechanism for providing criticism to 
Chinese government at all levels,53 to mandate that the 
“governments . . . shall properly handle” such criticisms, and to prevent 
retaliation against complainants.54  Some argue, however, that the law was 
intended not to preserve free speech, but to address the increasing number of 
petitioners coming to Beijing.55  One prominent scholar noted:  “The law 
became an instrument for the leaders to use to claim that they were acting 
according to the law, despite the fact that the PRC has never scrutinized the 
law by constitutional review.  The authorities have persecuted innocent 
Chinese in complete defiance of the law.”56 
2. Criminal Laws Prohibiting Disturbing Social Order Threaten Free 
Speech 
Criminal laws prohibiting disturbing public order further hinder 
promises of free speech.  The Chinese Criminal Code (“Criminal Code”) 
provides a good example of how criminal sanctions suppress free 
expression.57  The Criminal Code’s stated goals are to “struggle against 
crime and the realities in the country, with a view to punishing crime and 
protecting the people.”58  Article 290 of the Code criminalizes situations 
                                           
51
  See LIN FENG, supra note 48, at 273. 
52
  See Xiaoping Chen, supra note 31, at 232. 
53
  See generally RCLV arts.1 & 2. 
54
  See id. art. 3. 
55
  See Xiaoping Chen, supra note 31, at 232. 
56
  Id. at 246. 
57
  The Criminal Code was adopted by the Second Sess. of the Fifth Nat’l People’s Cong. on July 1, 
1979, and amended by the Fifth Sess. of the Eighth Nat’l People’s Cong. on Mar. 14, 1997. 
58
  Criminal Law art. 1 (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 14, 1997, 
effective Oct. 1, 1997) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) (P.R.C.). 
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“where crowds are assembled to disturb public order with serious 
consequences.”59  The law sentences “ringleaders” of such disturbances to 
between three and seven years in prison, and other active participants can 
receive up to three years imprisonment.60  The Code features a separate 
subsection prescribing more severe punishments for those who assemble 
with the intention to “attack state organs.”61  Similarly, Article 291 of the 
Criminal Code forbids crowds from assembling to disturb order at public 
places, and “when the circumstances are serious,” punishes ringleaders with 
up to five years imprisonment.62  Under the crime of conducting business 
illegally, found in Article 225 of the Criminal Code, the government 
punishes one who publishes, prints, copies or distributes illegal publications, 
and—in so doing—“severely jeopardizes social order.”63   
3. Civil Laws That Forbid Disturbing Social Order Often Curtail Free 
Speech 
In addition to constitutional provisions and criminal laws, civil laws 
restricting speech regularly thwart free speech laws intended to promote free 
flow of information in Chinese society.64  As Internet use increased 
dramatically in the new millennium, Chinese officials became concerned 
with the new medium’s potential for spreading controversial information.65  
The Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Administration 
Service (“PAINIS”),66 enacted in 2005, represented a concerted effort by the 
Chinese government to regulate dissemination of news information over the 
Internet.67  Promulgated by the Ministry for Information Industry and the 
Press Office of the State Council, these rules represented the first meaningful 
                                           
59
  Id. art. 290. 
60
  Id. 
61
  Id. 
62
  Id. art. 291. 
63
  Interpretation of the Sup. People's Ct. on the Application of Law in Trying the Criminal Cases of 
Illegal Publication, art. 11 (promulgated by Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 23, 1998, effective Dec. 17, 1998) 
ISINOLAW (last visited Feb. 13, 2008) (P.R.C.); see also Criminal Law art. 225 (promulgated by Standing 
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 13, 
2009) (P.R.C.).. 
64
  See generally Provisions on Administration of Internet News Information Service [PAINIS] 
(promulgated by Ministry of Info. Indus. & Press Office of St. Council, Sept. 25, 2005, effective Sept. 25, 
2005) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) (P.R.C.). 
65
  See generally OpenNet Initiative, China Tightens Controls on Internet News Content Through 
Additional Regulations (July 5, 2006), http://opennet.net/bulletins/012 (last visited Jan. 28, 2009) 
[hereinafter OpenNet Initiative]; see also Joseph Kahn, China Sets New Media Restrictions, This Time for 
the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/25/international/ 
asia/25cnd-china.html. 
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revision to the existing laws governing Internet news, which were passed in 
2000.68 
Passage of PAINIS represents an attempt to combat the Internet’s 
effect on the dissemination of controversial speech in China.69  While 
PAINIS prohibit certain forms of speech that Western societies prohibit—
such as obscene pornography—they go much further by prohibiting the 
spread of ideas that officials believe disturb social order.70  Specifically, 
Article 19 decrees that “any news information which is published or 
transmitted by or any electronic bulletin service of current affairs and 
politics which is provided by an Internet news information service provider” 
may not “disturb the public order or destroy the social stability by spreading 
any rumor.”71 
In practice, however, a large amount of sex, violence, and other 
immoral types of speech are tolerated, while political dissent routinely draws 
the scrutiny of Chinese censors.72  While “the range of permissible topics for 
private speech continued to expand . . . . public speeches, academic 
discussions, and speeches at meetings or in public forums covered by the 
media remained circumscribed.”73  Furthermore, just last year Chinese 
propaganda officials issued new guidelines limiting media coverage of 
various controversial topics, including judicial corruption and campaigns by 
legal rights defenders.74 
Chinese dissidents who wish to speak out against their government 
theoretically have the option to “[report] facts, [submit] proposals or 
opinions, or [file] a complaint.”75  The RCLV revised the petition process, by 
addressing complaints based on territorial jurisdiction.76  To that end, the law 
emphasizes the need for “on-site settlement of problems.”77  While the 
government presented this reform as facilitating free expression, many 
critics believe the unspoken goal of this revision was to deter activists from 
                                           
68
  See OpenNet Initiative, supra note 65; Kahn, supra note 65. 
69
  PAINIS; see OpenNet Initiative, supra note 65. 
70
  PAINIS art. 19 § 6. 
71
  Id.  
72
  Shauna Emmons, Freedom of Speech in China: A Possibility or a Prohibition?, 23 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 249, 259 (2001).  A particularly poignant example of censorship in the publishing 
realm is found in new history textbooks that revise Chinese history, effectively editing out controversial 
figures and events in favor of “colorful tutorials on economics, technology, social customs and 
globalization.”  Joseph Kahn, Where’s Mao? Chinese Revise History Books, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1 2006, 
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expressing dissident views in Beijing during the Olympics, when the nation 
most needed to project a positive national image.78  This practice effectively 
inhibits, rather than facilitates, free speech by diverting petitioners to local 
officials, who often discourage persons from petitioning and prevent them 
from traveling to Beijing to seek higher recourse.79  Thus, the RCLV works 
to thwart not only its own potential for enforcing citizens’ free speech rights, 
but their free speech right more generally as it is embodied in Article 35 and 
other guarantees. 
C. Free Speech Guarantees Go Unrealized Due to the Problems of 
Enforceability Inherent in the CPRC 
Another factor that prevents China’s commitments to free speech from 
being realized is the very nature of the Chinese law, which is both imprecise 
and largely discretionary.80  Unlike traditional Western legal systems, “[t]he 
current Chinese legal system does not formally or officially recognize cases 
or judicial precedents as a source of law.”81  Furthermore, judicial 
independence is vastly constrained in China as compared to Western 
societies, and some argue that “China’s judiciary does not appear to enjoy 
independence due to various external obstacles.”82  Both the National 
People’s Congress and the Central Committee of Politics and Law83 exercise 
judicial oversight.84  In addition, local Chinese people’s congresses have 
similar powers to supervise the activities of local courts.85  The end result of 
placing interpretative power in these bodies, rather than the courts, is that the 
application of Chinese law is often political, inconsistent, and subject to 
individual discretion.86 
The rule of law—the concept that a nation and all its various organs of 
government should adhere to a body of respected, enforceable laws—is a 
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  See Cha, supra note 17. 
79
  See Drew & Cha, supra note 1. 
80
  See Margaret Y.K. Woo, Law and Discretion in Contemporary Chinese Courts, in THE LIMITS OF 
THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 163, 172 (Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000) (“Unlike the Anglo-American 
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  WEI LUO, CHINESE LAW AND LEGAL RESEARCH 132 (2005); see also Woo, supra note 80. 
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  See LIN FENG, supra note 48, at 232. 
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  The Central Committee of Politics and Law is a subcommittee of the Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party. 
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  See WEI LUO, supra note 81, at 73-74. 
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  See Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments, art. 44 
(promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 28, 1995, effective Feb. 28, 1995) (amended 
1995) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Jan. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.); see also WEI LUO, supra note 81, at 31, 73. 
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  See Woo, supra note 80, at 163-86.  
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relatively new concept in China.87  For most of China’s history, the country 
was governed by rule of man, wherein deference was paid to human (rather 
than legal) authority.88  The rule of law has been formally endorsed by the 
Communist Party and was codified in law in the late 1990s.89  The Chinese 
recognized rule of law as an important prerequisite to a successful Olympic 
Games prior to the 2008 Olympics.90  Despite these affirmations, the concept 
has yet to take hold fully.91 
One theorist opines that “judging from the current practice in China, 
there is still a long way to go before China can become a rule of law state in 
reality.”92  One of the reasons for this phenomenon is the lack of a rule of 
law tradition in China; civil rights are not being enforced currently because 
they have not been enforced in the past and there is no actual framework for 
their enforcement.93  Another theorist blames the country’s leadership, 
arguing that “Chinese leaders are unwilling to establish a rule of law.  They 
merely use the law as an instrument . . . to crack down whenever and 
wherever they wish.  They do not allow the law to restrain their power.”94 
The struggle over free speech is a poignant example of the failure of 
complete rule of law in China.  While provisions for free speech and 
expression are present in the Constitution, they lack practical application.95  
As one theorist argues:  “Legal provision on freedom of expression does not 
mean that Chinese citizens actually enjoy the freedom of expression, 
especially expression on politically sensitive issues.  In practice, the freedom 
of expression is often restricted.”96  Whatever the cause, lack of freedom of 
speech in China is negatively affecting the country’s campaign to foster rule 
of law in the country.  As one writer opines: “[T]he many due process 
violations even under China’s own laws are clearly inconsistent with the 
efforts to implement rule of law and should be rectified.”97 
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  See LIN FENG, supra note 48, at 38-39. 
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  See id. at 38. 
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  See Xiaoping Chen, supra note 31, at 241. 
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  See LIN FENG, supra note 48, at 269. 
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D. Chinese Culture, Including the Influence of Communism, Fosters a 
Regime of Censorship that Prevents Free Speech Guarantees from 
Being Realized 
Although they may echo the language of Western laws, China’s free 
speech laws exist in a very different cultural context; as a result, they are 
enforced in a very different manner.98  Namely, the cultural value placed on 
the appearance of social order and the elimination of threats to Communist 
control has led to a culture of censorship in China.  While the Chinese 
understanding of freedom of expression is similar to the Western 
understanding, and the restrictions are similar in their language, they operate 
very differently.99  “The restriction in China is much tighter,” particularly 
when the speech at issue relates to the government or Communist Party 
leadership.100  Any politically controversial publication is tightly controlled 
by the Communist party.101 
1. China Maintains Strict Control of the Press 
China holds a very different conception of freedom of press than do 
most Western countries.  The Chinese believe that freedom of expression 
attaches to oral expression only, and does not extend to the media.102  
Freedom of press in China, then, consists of citizens’ freedom to publish in 
all periodicals, which are put forth by publishing houses that must adhere to 
the state’s rules.103  While these rules purport to provide freedom of press, 
they contain various restrictions on publications, including those that may 
endanger national unity or honor.104  Thus, the same government policies 
that appear to grant freedom of press actually limit such freedom, as the 
press is subject to government censorship based on any perceived threat its 
work presents to Chinese social order.105 
Compared to other sectors, the Chinese government maintains strict 
control over the publishing industry.106  Anyone who publishes material that 
                                           
98
  See LIN FENG, supra note 48, at 268-69. 
99
  See id. at 269; Emmons, supra note 72, at 271. 
100
  See LIN FENG, supra note 48, at 269. 
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  See id. at 269-70. 
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  See, e.g., id. art. 5. 
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addresses national security and social stability, or that has any significant 
impact on Chinese politics, economy, culture, or military, could be subject to 
criminal investigation and administrative sanction.107  While the Chinese 
government generally imposes tight censorship on publishing, it is even 
more stringent when it comes to legal publishing,108 which means that the 
outcomes of many legal proceedings remain secret.109 
2. In Addition to Strict Government Control of the Press, Various Other 
Sociopolitical Elements Contribute to Suppression of Free Speech in 
China 
Various other sociopolitical factors have militated against the 
fulfillment of free speech commitments in China.  One theorist attributes the 
fundamental lack of procedural justice in China partly to the country’s long 
legal tradition of fusing legal and ethical norms, and allowing socialist 
legality to influence the Nation’s legal system.110  He suggests that “[t]he 
problem of implementation also relates to the legal culture as it is reflected 
in the behavior of legal personnel,” who are focused on getting a “good 
result,” the meaning of which is largely culturally informed.111 
Others blame the system of Communist Party control.  One author 
argues that, “[d]ue to the supremacy of the Party, the laws and courts have 
become simple instruments of Party rule.  Supreme loyalty rests with the 
Party, not with the law or the courts . . . .  Such a loyalty-based structure 
allows no space at all for the law.”112  Still others blame China’s 
subordination of individual freedoms on a perceived need to maintain social 
order in the face of other nations’ hostility to socialism.  As one human 
rights commentator wrote, “[g]iven this belief in an aggregated society, it is 
not surprising that individual freedoms, such as speech, are frequently 
suppressed.”113 
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109
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III. LAWS PROMOTING FREE SPEECH HAVE BEEN UNDERMINED BY THE 
ZEALOUS APPLICATION OF LAWS AIMED AT CURBING DISTURBANCE OF 
SOCIAL ORDER 
Whatever the historical, cultural, or legal sources of this problem, 
China must address the problem of laws against “disturbing social order.”  
Instances of public order disturbances grew by almost fifty percent from 
2003-2005, going from 58,000 instances in 2003 to 87,000 instances in 
2005; this increase is attributable to a “surge of mass social unrest events.”114  
Some see this as the inevitable result of a long period of fruitless petitioning 
and complaint filing.115  This phenomenon suggests that China’s strategy of 
suppressing free speech through persecuting those that disturb social order 
by expressing controversial beliefs is, at best, not working and, at worst, 
backfiring.  “With legal avenues to seek redress choked off, citizens are 
taking to the streets in massive, increasingly violent, protests.”116  This, in 
turn, means more opportunities for the government to use laws against 
disturbing social order to suppress free speech activities.  The vicious cycle 
of free speech suppression further threatens the rule of law, which is 
undermined when public order laws are allowed to trump free speech 
guarantees. 
A. China Has Denied Individuals Civil and Human Rights and Silenced 
Controversial Speech by Employing Laws That Criminalize 
“Disturbing Social Order” 
The Chinese government has used criminal laws prohibiting 
“disturbing social order” to suppress controversial speech, undercutting 
China’s commitments to civil rights.  As one writer puts it, crimes such as 
“disturbing social order” and “illegal assembly” are really “catch-all excuses 
used to crack down on rights advocates.”117  Furthermore, laws suppressing 
free speech in the name of preserving social order affect more than just 
Chinese citizens.  Indeed, they affect foreigners, as well.  Two examples of 
how such censorship affects foreigners include, first, dissidents who are 
denied access to the country118 and, second, foreign journalists who are 
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  See Xiaoping Chen, supra note 31, at 241. 
115
  Id. 
116
  See Peerenboom, Paradigm or Problem?, supra note 41, at 218; see also Richard McGregor, 
China’s Official Data Confirm Rise in Social Unrest, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d6050a66-8958-11da-94a6-0000779e2340.html.  
117
  See Xiaoping Chen, supra note 31, at 243. 
118
  See Bennhold & Bradsher, supra note 39 (reporting that “Students for a Free Tibet . . . said three 
Americans had been detained after trying to protest near the site of the opening ceremonies in Beijing.”). 
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rendered impotent in their trade by Chinese censorship.119  As foreigners 
realize that China still lacks the rule of law, they will probably limit their 
interactions with the Chinese, for fear that their rights will not be respected. 
1. Protests Denied, Protestors Persecuted 
While China has procedures through which citizens can apply for 
permits to hold peaceful protests, government officials rarely grant such 
permits, and protest applicants and those who petition the government 
frequently face punishment for disturbing social order.  One example of the 
relationship between petitioning and charges of disturbing social order is the 
controversial case of Wang Dan.  Once a leader of the student protests in 
Tiananmen Square, Wang Dan was later detained for his role in coauthoring 
and signing various petitions addressed to the government on the sixth 
anniversary of that historic event.120  The government told his relatives that 
he was under investigation for disturbing social order.121  He was eventually 
charged with conspiracy to subvert the government, the most serious charge 
in Chinese criminal law.122 
The 2008 Olympics provide another fascinating yet troubling case 
study of how China’s petitioning laws result in charges of “disturbing social 
order.”  As part of its preparations for the 2008 Olympics, many were 
pleasantly surprised by China’s announcement that it would be allowing 
protests during the Games.123  The minimal restrictions—that the protests 
must be preapproved and take place only in designated protest zones—
seemed reasonable.124  Those who thought this announcement seemed too 
good to be true, however, were sadly proven correct.  Despite seventy-seven 
applications, not one protest ever took place in the designated zones.125 
                                           
119
  See generally Jacobs, Limit Web Access, supra note 37. 
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30, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/30/sports/olympics/30china.html [hereinafter 
Jacobs, No Voice Too Small]. 
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Beyond mere denial of protest petitions, many claim that they were 
harassed due to their attempts to secure permission to protest.126  Some who 
came to Beijing were confronted by police from their far-away hometowns, 
who personally escorted them home; others were prevented from going to 
Beijing to apply in the first place.127  Some who applied went missing.128  
Some foreigners seeking to take advantage of the relaxed speech laws never 
made it into the country, while others who succeeded in entering were 
thrown out once their mission was made clear.129  Lawyers who have taken 
up the cause of protecting these individuals have themselves become 
suspects of “disturbing social order” crimes in the past,130 likely deterring 
them and others from such work. 
In many cases, the simple act of filing a petition proved dangerous to 
petitioners.  Two elderly women—Wu Dianyuan and Wang Xiuying—were 
threatened with re-education through labor due to their repeated requests for 
protest approval.131  This controversial form of punishment allows 
authorities to detain citizens without actually filing charges against them, 
and it has been an easy way for Chinese officials to imprison political 
dissidents accused of disturbing social order.132  At least six others were 
detained after applying for demonstration permits.133  These detentions 
confirmed some citizens’ fears that the petitioning law was actually designed 
to expose and jail political dissidents.134 
These acts of suppression not only violate the temporary law 
explicitly allowing such protests, but also run counter to longstanding free 
speech protections in China.135  For instance, such acts breach the Article 35 
guarantee that “citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of 
speech . . . of procession and of demonstration.”136  Despite these 
constitutional guarantees, no one was allowed to demonstrate even though 
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several dozen petitions were filed.137  Such suppressive acts further infringe 
upon the rights protected under the LAPD.  As discussed above, the LAPD 
supplements the promises of Article 35, guaranteeing Chinese citizens the 
rights to assembly, procession, and demonstration.138  Each one of these 
guarantees was flouted by government officials who denied citizens’ 
requests to protest during the Games. 
2. The Chinese Government Censored Controversial Internet News Items 
and Blogs 
The Internet has presented a unique challenge to Communist Party 
censorship.139  By 2006, China ranked second only to the United States in 
number of citizens connected to the Internet, with more than 111 million 
users.140  In the struggle over Internet content, political speech over the 
Internet has been suppressed as the Communist Party has employed a variety 
of technologies to censor this new medium. 
The government has shut down websites that express unpopular views 
or discuss politically-sensitive subjects such as Tibet, Taiwan, and the 
Tiananmen Square massacre.141  It has detained and convicted bloggers for 
posting their controversial, but peaceful, views on the Internet.142  Much of 
this censorship has occurred under the guise of preserving social order.143  
As of 2004, at least fifty-five people were incarcerated in Chinese 
prisons on charges stemming from their Internet posts.144  Wu Wei’s site—a 
forum for discussions on political reform, human rights, and other subjects 
considered controversial by the Communist Party—was blocked, hacked, or 
otherwise shut down thirty-eight times between 2001 and 2004 (before the 
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enactment of the PAINIS).145  In 2002, Beijing police arrested two essayists 
who regularly posted on Wu Wei’s site.146 
One noteworthy example of Internet censorship in the name of 
preserving social order in China is revealed in the saga that has unfolded 
over the popular worldwide reference site Wikipedia.147  The user-controlled 
nature of the site presented a unique challenge to Chinese censors.148  As a 
result, the site has been repeatedly shut down by the government when 
controversial information (such as chronicles of the Tiananmen Square 
massacre or Taiwanese independence) has been posted by users.149 
Such censorship of Internet news and opinion writing violates 
constitutional provisions and laws that guarantee freedom of expression.  For 
instance, this practice violates Article 35’s explicit decrees of “freedom 
speech, [and] of press.”150  Furthermore, censorship of work that discusses 
controversial government policies or politicians violates authors’ Article 41 
rights to criticize the government and its officials.151 
B. Free Speech Has Been Denied to Persons Working in the News 
Industry Through Commercial Laws Employing the Term “Disturbing 
Social Order” 
Cultural understandings about freedom of expression in China, 
combined with state control of the media, have led to a narrow 
understanding of expression that encompasses only oral speech.152  Freedom 
of press is limited by state control.153  More specifically, commercial laws 
employing the term “disturbing social order,” such as the PAINIS and its 
subsequent revisions, have prevented the dissemination of news in China.154  
This censorship contradicts Article 35’s promise of a free press and weakens 
the rule of law in China. 
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The Chinese government has imprisoned journalists who give news to 
foreigners.155  Editors of publications who speak out against government 
policies face potential dismissal.156  One example of censorship in the name 
of preserving social order is found in the story of a China Youth Daily editor, 
Li Datong.  He posted a scathing critique of a new policy of the publication 
that was blatantly aimed at pleasing Communist Party leadership.157  In his 
post, he argued that writers had been “debased by this . . . scheme,” which 
would “unavoidably create a malignant situation of servility to superior 
officials.”158  After one day, during which his letter spread like wildfire 
across the Internet in China (and abroad), sites were asked to take down the 
piece with no legal justification.159 
Internet censorship also was apparent at the 2008 Olympics.  When 
trying to win their bid for the games, Chinese officials assured the 
International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) that journalists would have the 
same level of Internet access they had enjoyed at previous games.  In 
practice, though, journalists complained that they could not access 
information about controversial topics, such as Tibet or Tiananmen Square, 
over the Internet or elsewhere.160  China’s practice of suppressing 
controversial speech by reporters flouts Article 35’s decree of 
“freedom . . . of press.”161  There can hardly be freedom of press when the 
state forbids research and writing on controversial topics that it has declared 
off-limits.  
C. Laws Against Disturbing Social Order Have Led to Self-Censorship 
Beyond criminalizing behavior the Constitution is supposed to protect 
these laws also have a deterrent effect, as both individuals and publications 
have begun to self-censor.  “Many authors, editors and publishers exercise 
self-censorship,” which is sometimes even stricter than that exercised by the 
Communist Party.162  For example, it appears that some members of the 
Wikipedia community have suggested self-censorship as a way to avoid 
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government shutdown.163  Journalists in particular have an incentive to self-
censor in order to avoid the possible imprisonment, exile, and job 
termination they face if they go beyond the bounds tolerated by the 
government.164  Self-censorship not only prevents dissenting views from 
being published, but also prevents coverage of enforcement actions against 
those who do not self-censor. 
Self-censorship stems not only from blatant government censorship, 
but also from more subtle forms of government control over news media.  
Stations need rights in order to broadcast in a given geographic market, 
which some suspect causes them to self-censor in order to ensure their 
continued economic survival.165  Reporters need access to certain restricted 
areas, such as the Sichuan region in the aftermath of the 2008 earthquake 
there.  If they violate the terms of their access, reporters risk having access 
to restricted areas revoked.166  Government information officers may pose as 
journalists in order to act as spies for the government:  pumping reporters for 
information, preventing photographers from shooting, and taking pictures of 
journalists pursuing controversial pieces in preparation for blacklisting 
them.167 
D. There Is No Procedural Enforcement Mechanism for Those Whose 
Rights Have Been Violated 
Some argue that the real problem is China’s written law, as opposed to 
cultural factors that militate against free speech and weaken the rule of law.  
A great deal of China’s written law neither provides remedial provisions 
with relevant procedures for victims, nor imposes specific legal 
responsibility on rule violators.168  Some theorists argue that there is a 
fundamental lack of procedural justice in China.169  While there are laws 
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against certain behaviors, there are not rules in the written law indicating the 
legal consequences for those who ignore the law.170  Where Chinese law 
contains no specific enforcement provision—which is common—there is a 
great deal of judicial discretion.171 
The commonplace lack of enforceability and lack of remedies in 
China’s written law present problems.172  These problems become clear in 
analyzing Article 35, which appears to be a broad grant of free speech.173  
Implementation of free speech guarantees is hampered, however, by China’s 
minimal procedural protections for those accused of crimes of disturbing 
social order.174  A startling, though not isolated, example of lack of 
protection is the story of Ching Cheong, a reporter who was thrown in jail 
for months without being told his charge.  Ching Cheong was later convicted 
in a one-day, private trial, of which there is no official record.175 
Free speech protections are also thwarted by the fact that no remedy 
exists for those whose rights of free speech are denied, and there are no legal 
sanctions against offenders.176  While the rights provisions exist, there is no 
procedural law by which to enforce them.177  In discussing Article 35, one 
author notes that “even today, no law provides any remedy or procedure for 
citizens whose ‘constitutional’ freedoms are impaired, and no legal sanctions 
[exist] for violators.”178  Thus, Article 35 becomes an empty promise, 
guaranteeing nothing. 
While some Chinese laws briefly address sanctions, these provisions 
“are often too general and vague to apply.”179  Imprecision in the language of 
the law impairs enforcement by imposing an ambiguous mandate on legal 
officials, who are then hesitant to enforce it.180  For instance, the last 
sentence of Article 41 appears to imply a cause of action, stating that 
“[c]itizens who have suffered losses through infringement of their civil 
rights by any state organ or functionary have the right to compensation in 
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accordance with the law.”181  However, there is no definition of 
“infringement of civil rights,” nor of what exactly compensation would 
entail.  Moreover, given that Chinese courts lack real independence,182 it 
seems unlikely that free speech activists could use this law to their 
advantage; it seems unlikely that the government would deem its own 
suppression of free speech an infringement of citizens’ civil rights. 
IV. CHINA CAN REPAIR THE DAMAGE DONE BY LAWS PREVENTING 
“DISTURBING SOCIAL ORDER” BY DEFINING THE TERM AND CREATING 
APPROPRIATE OUTLETS FOR DISSENT 
In order to fulfill the promise of free speech, China need not get rid of 
laws against “disturbing social order” completely, but it must define key 
terms so they do not encompass constitutionally protected forms of 
nonviolent speech.  China must also create appropriate channels for dissent.  
If China refuses to strengthen its protection of free speech, it risks increased 
instability and, in turn, it risks its prosperity. 
A. A Comparative Perspective:  United States’ Treason Law, Freedom of 
Speech, and Constitutional Vagueness Jurisprudence 
The United States’ treatment of sedition provides an illuminating 
contrast to China’s struggle with freedom of speech and crimes of disturbing 
social order.  While not a perfect analogy, U.S. treason laws are similar to 
laws against disturbing social order, as such laws also prevent speaking out 
against the government in a way that hinders the government’s ability to 
govern. 
The United States has increasingly protected nonviolent free speech 
through a variety of mechanisms.  After their experience under British rule 
and the failure of the Articles of Confederation, the drafters of the United 
States Constitution (particularly the Anti-Federalists) were concerned with 
providing adequate guarantees for civil liberties.183  The Bill of Rights was 
adopted in 1791 in order to provide such guarantees.184  One such protection 
was the First Amendment, guaranteeing, amongst other things, that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
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press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”185 
The drafters of the United States Constitution specifically defined 
treason in order to avoid the abuses that had occurred under English rule.186  
Under Article III, section 3, clause 1, treason “shall consist only in levying 
War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid of 
Comfort.”187  Furthermore, the United States Constitution itself provides 
built-in procedural protections for those accused of treason, adding that 
“[n]o Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two 
Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.”188 
The first half of the twentieth century did see some suppression of free 
speech in the United States, especially in times of war.189  For instance, in 
1942 the Supreme Court enunciated the “fighting words” doctrine, whereby 
certain personal insults were deemed unprotected speech.190  However, 
protection of free speech behavior—including allowing controversial speech 
against the government—increased in the subsequent fifty years.191  The 
Supreme Court has narrowed the “fighting words” doctrine so that it will 
“only tolerate the prohibition of inflammatory speech likely to cause an 
outbreak of violence and disorder.”192  It has also provided the “clear and 
present danger” test, under which speech may only be abridged when it is 
aimed at producing imminent unlawful behavior and is likely to succeed in 
that respect.193 
Furthermore, the United States has a specific constitutional 
jurisprudence invalidating laws that are unconstitutionally vague or 
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overbroad.  United States’ courts can (and do) invalidate restrictions on free 
expression where the means of doing so are impermissible, even though the 
speech itself may be constitutionally restricted or prohibited using 
alternative means.194 
B. In Order to Restore the Legitimacy of Its Laws, China Must Clearly 
Define the Term “Disturbing Social Order” 
Like many laws in China, laws against “disturbing social order” are 
vague and leave citizens and officials alike without proper guidance as to the 
laws’ limits.  The very meaning of the term is elusive.  The Congressional 
Executive Commission on China lists several Chinese free expression laws 
that it considers vague and overbroad, many of which include the term 
“disturbing social order.”195  The list includes, but is not limited to, China’s 
Regulations on the Administration of the Publishing Industry,196 the 
Measures for the Administration of Internet Domain Names of China,197 and 
the Management Provisions on Electronic Bulletin Services in Internet.198  
The Commission notes that “[t]he wording of these laws would not 
necessarily be vague and overbroad if PRC legislative bodies provided 
statutory guidance” as to what key terms mean, or “if China’s courts issued 
meaningful opinions when deciding cases involving such matters.”199  But 
this has yet to be the case.  One theorist argues that the general terms found 
in Chinese laws are so consistently broad as to make one wonder if 
“discretion has been purposefully built into them.”200  Another argues that 
the discretion of Chinese courts has led to great variance in outcomes for 
similar cases, which has undermined the concept of a predictable legal 
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system, and that this is especially problematic in cases involving individual 
liberties.201 
Almost all countries have laws aimed at those who seek to subvert the 
government in socially unacceptable ways.202  One problem with China’s 
laws against disturbing social order is their lack of specificity.203  What 
constitutes “disturbing social order,” or what is meant by “serious” 
circumstances or consequences, is never defined.204  When the laws present 
ambiguous phraseology without any guidance for government officials or 
citizens, Chinese police and courts interpret these terms broadly and 
inconsistently.205  The vagueness swallows free speech activities that are 
supposedly protected under Article 35206 and the LAPD.207  Thus, while the 
China’s quest for increased rule of law does not dictate that laws 
incorporating such vague language be repealed, it does indicate that these 
ambiguous terms must be further defined in a way that comports with 
constitutionally protected free speech in order for rule of law to truly be 
fulfilled.208 
C. China Must Also Create Appropriate Outlets for Dissent and 
Procedural Protections for Those Accused of Disturbing Social Order 
Beyond limiting judicial discretion by defining “disturbing social 
order,” there must also be legal outlets for nonviolent dissent in order for 
China to fulfill its commitments to free speech.  The laws enacted prior to 
the Olympics to allow increasing freedoms to journalists were a fine start in 
theory, but they were abused in practice.209  They also expired recently.210  
The same was true for the special petitioning regulations that were enacted 
for the 2008 Olympics.211  Chinese citizens need actual channels—from 
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protest pens to chat rooms—to express their views about controversial 
topics.212 
To that end, perhaps China should create an inherent cause of action in 
all of the laws that purport to protect free speech, imposing liability on 
officials who seek to subvert such laws.  This would force the government 
and the police to think carefully before arresting persons expressing 
nonviolent free speech.  However, as Article 41 illustrates, this inherent 
cause of action will only promote the rule of law to the extent that free 
speech suppression is categorized as a civil rights violation.213  China also 
needs to provide procedural protections for free speech activists, so that 
those accused of disturbing social order can have a fair trial, and so those 
who feel their rights have been unfairly abridged can seek redress.214 
D. China Would Benefit from Expanding Freedom of Speech 
The extreme and disproportionate enforcement of the provisions 
against disturbing social order undermines the legitimacy of China’s free 
speech laws, threatening major aspects of the rule of law in China.  Such 
enforcement has led to human rights abuses that have diminished China’s 
stature in the international community.  By clearly defining what constitutes 
disturbing social order, China could protect freedom of speech and 
strengthen its internal and international legitimacy. 
1. Expanding Freedom of Speech in China Will Result in Domestic 
Benefits 
Resolving China’s conflict of laws will help prevent human rights 
abuses against citizens and support the rule of law.  In order to establish a 
complete and vigorous rule of law, China must create effective enforcement 
machinery and ensure that citizens trust the legal system.215  Whereas the 
discretion currently enjoyed by the courts and government officials tends to 
“make law not only unpredictable but oppressive,”216 promulgating a clear 
definition of “disturbing social order” will eliminate some of that discretion 
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which, in turn, should make the laws more predictable and less prone to 
human rights abuse.  As one author put it, “a more considered analysis of the 
nexus between the acts and disruptions of the public order or harm to the 
state would expand greatly the range of civil and political rights without 
harming national security or state interests.”217 
Currently, many Chinese have lost faith in the country’s judicial 
system.218  Recent experience indicates that expanding freedom of 
expression could reinvest Chinese citizens in their government.  Despite the 
human rights offenses during the 2008 Olympics, China’s experiment with 
increased media openness during the lead-up to the games “[did] wonders to 
help China’s image domestically.”219 
Moreover, increasing freedom of speech has the potential to 
affirmatively benefit a country of China’s size by improving the free flow of 
information.  Some blame the spread of China’s public health crises—such 
as AIDS, SARS, and the recent incidence of contaminated baby food and 
milk—on the country’s continued insistence on media censorship.220  
According to this logic, by permanently extending and increasing the media 
freedoms that were temporarily granted during the 2008 Olympics, China 
could make an important stride “toward ensuring the timely and effective 
identification and resolution of future public-health crises.”221  This logic 
could likely extend beyond public health issues, to natural disasters, 
economic crises, and so on.  In a country of China’s size, the media could 
help stop problems before they become exponentially worse, but doing so 
would require that the government loosen its grip on the media. 
2. Expanding Freedom of Speech and Expression for Individuals and the 
Media Will Improve China’s Image Internationally, Attracting Foreign 
Business and Respect 
Resolving the conflict between free speech and laws against 
disturbing social order is necessary for China to achieve lasting domestic 
stability, legitimize its government, and engage the citizenry in the political 
process.222  While China has stepped into the economic limelight in recent 
years, the limelight cannot completely supplant a stable rule of law that will 
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inspire confidence among foreign investors.223  As one scholar put it, “[a]s 
[China’s] economy becomes more market oriented, it demands a type of law 
with higher predictability to provide a stable economic environment.”224  
Furthermore, foreign investors may applaud increased human rights—the 
dismal state of which has dissuaded them from dealing with the country.225 
E. China’s History of Censorship Will Be Difficult to Change 
Despite the advantages China would enjoy from expanding free 
speech, China’s history of censorship may make this transition difficult.  A 
Western solution may not be the best option for China, due to both China’s 
culture of controlled speech and the fact that Western ideas are currently in 
flux.  Transition in present Western legal life reflects the limitations of 
formal legal rationality, as “maximum formal justice does not necessarily 
lead to maximum social justice.”226  Some might fear that such a move 
would be so antithetical to the Chinese way of life that it could potentially 
lead to chaos; the Chinese legal and governmental system is based on the 
communist ideal of unity of thought.  One author also suggests that China 
has made great strides and that Westerners fail to see this because they view 
the situation from a Western perspective.227 
Some may argue that China will reach (indeed, has reached) 
superpower status, while still maintaining strict control over freedom of 
speech.  They may believe that the country’s large population and increasing 
economic and political prowess compensates for lacking civil rights 
protections.  Others, particularly the Chinese government itself, insist that 
both free speech protection and the rule of law already exist in China.228  An 
intermediate view maintains that China has made great strides, particularly 
given how recently it began to develop its rule of law, but that it has done so 
at the expense of its citizens’ civil and political rights.229  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Despite the uncertainty inherent in achieving the significant changes 
suggested in this Comment, the benefits of expanding freedom of speech are 
worth the risks for China.  The Chinese treated the 2008 Olympics as a 
chance to finally showcase their achievements, not only in the realm of 
athletics but also with respect to the rule of law and their status in the 
international community.  This very need to prove itself to the international 
community, however, illustrates that the Chinese citizenry and government 
recognize there is work yet to be done in expanding freedom of expression 
in China. 
Free speech guarantees are a necessary precursor to enduring political 
stability and economic prosperity.  Foreign investors want to work in a 
country where they can be confident their voices will be heard and their 
contracts will be honored.  By clearly defining crimes of disturbing social 
order in a way that protects free speech, China can legitimize its government 
and engage its citizenry.  This broadening of free speech may, for lack of a 
better term, disturb social order in a way that fundamentally challenges the 
traditional Chinese culture of censorship.  Ultimately, the country’s future 
will turn on what China wants more: international respect or the appearance 
of national solidarity. 
